Pruden emphasizes the necessity for post-quantum cryptography and regulatory alignment to counteract the threat posed by advanced quantum computing.
By Alex Pruden|Edited by Betsy Farber Jun 12, 2026, 3:31 p.m. 5 min read
Last month, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced its plans to allocate over $2 billion to nine companies focused on quantum computing technologies that could potentially undermine the cryptographic systems safeguarding Bitcoin, Ethereum, and much of the internet.
This funding goes beyond typical research grants; it signifies a strategic move towards industrial manufacturing and aims for long-term financial returns. IBM will receive $1 billion to establish a quantum-grade superconducting wafer foundry, while GlobalFoundries is set to obtain $375 million for a multi-architecture fabrication facility. The remaining $636 million is divided among seven firms engaged in developing quantum computing across various modalities, including superconducting, trapped ion, photonic, and neutral-atom technologies.
When a nation invests in specialized fabrication facilities for a technology, it indicates a shift from questioning the technology's viability to focusing on how quickly it can be scaled. The Commerce Department views quantum computing as having surpassed its experimental phase and aims to secure a leading position in the race for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) ahead of potential adversaries. The ability to compromise widely used cryptography would provide a significant strategic advantage for any government.
To protect against a CRQC, the development of post-quantum cryptography is essential. However, the defense sector lacks a comparable level of financial backing.
Quantum computing capabilities are reportedly advancing rapidly. Over the past year, Google's quantum researchers have published increasingly alarming estimates regarding the resources needed to break elliptic curve cryptography. This surge in public research has raised concerns; moving forward, it is anticipated that much of the field's research will remain confidential. Experts recommend that the transition to post-quantum cryptography should commence without delay.
Funding is Not the Primary Issue
A common reaction to the U.S. government's funding announcement is that the defense sector requires similar financial support. The suggestion is to form an industry coalition, match the $2 billion funding, and finance post-quantum cryptography research at an equivalent scale to bridge the gap.
However, this response is misguided or at least inadequate. The challenge with post-quantum defense lies in the necessity for universal adoption of the solution. This issue is more about coordination than it is about funding. While financial resources can help the offensive side achieve capabilities, they cannot ensure the defense converges on a uniform solution.
Securing Bitcoin illustrates the complexity of the challenge. There exists a singular cryptographic system to defend, but its effectiveness hinges on the simultaneous transition of every wallet, custodian, exchange, and even dormant addresses to a new system. A partial migration leads to only partial protection. The defense must extend to millions of independent endpoints, each of which cannot be compelled to comply.
This is why many institutions heavily invested in Bitcoin have been hesitant. They are awaiting the necessary coordination, which cannot be achieved through mere research grants. An entity with sufficient authority to bring together protocol communities, custodians, and regulators is essential for a collective movement. No currently funded organization has stepped up to fulfill that role at the scale needed for Bitcoin.
The Geopolitical Competition
Government funding has accelerated offensive capabilities, and every dollar invested in quantum hardware shortens the defense's timeline.
The day following the U.S. announcement, Emmanuel Macron pledged €1 billion to enhance France's quantum strategy, urging Europe to "scale up" its investments, identifying the U.S. and China as competitors.
Prior to the U.S. announcement, China had funneled approximately $17.5 billion through three regional venture funds; the U.S. move now provides Beijing with the political justification to initiate another funding round. This scenario exemplifies a three-way industrial policy race, compressing everyone's planning timelines, regardless of their preparedness.
Immediate Actions Required
A proactive response must begin with coordinated migration efforts, initiated before offensive capabilities mature, as the transition period is lengthy and the available time has now diminished.
What sets the post-quantum situation apart is the magnitude of the coordination challenge. Bitcoin is particularly vulnerable: any address that has engaged in transactions has its public key publicly accessible on-chain, making it susceptible to forgery the moment elliptic curve cryptography is compromised, without a means of retraction.
The deprecation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) occurred because browser vendors established a cutoff during a time when the cryptographic landscape was significantly less complex. SHA-1 was officially deprecated by NIST despite never being demonstrably exploited. In both cases, institutional actors with the authority to enforce deadlines and drive adoption acted across their controlled systems.
Bitcoin and similar digital asset networks lack a central authority or vendor capable of mandating a hard deadline for network transition. The defense must be negotiated among diverse stakeholders who must reach consensus, with no single actor positioned to enforce compliance.
The most urgent aspect lies within the protocol community. The Bitcoin community needs to advance proposals for post-quantum migration while there is still opportunity for discussion regarding trade-offs, rather than settling for whatever can be implemented under duress.
Institutional custodians managing Bitcoin for ETF issuers, corporations, and sovereign entities (e.g., Coinbase, Fidelity, BNY Mellon, among others) must invest in migration infrastructure while the window for proactive enhancements is still open. Stablecoin issuers need to fortify their signing systems against potential post-quantum forgery.
Waiting for urgency to dictate action has proven ineffective. Institutions holding Bitcoin have been anticipating the moment when migration becomes sufficiently pressing to warrant serious investment. That moment is now passed.
The federal government has already established clear timelines. The transition to post-quantum cryptography standards, delineated in the NIST IR 8547, specifies deadlines: RSA-2048 and ECDSA at 112-bit security will be deprecated by 2030 and prohibited by 2035; all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms will be banned from NIST standards post-2035. National Security Memorandum 10 mandates federal systems to address quantum risks within the same timeframe. These are not merely aspirational goals; they are deadlines that compliance officers, vendors, and procurement officials throughout the federal government are actively planning for.
The digital asset sector should adhere to the same schedule. The Clarity Act, currently progressing through Congress, provides federal regulators with their first comprehensive framework for overseeing digital assets. This framework should require custodians, exchanges, and stablecoin issuers operating in the U.S. to publish plans for post-quantum migration, with milestones aligned to NIST's 2030 and 2035 deadlines. The CHIPS Act has expedited offensive capabilities, and the Clarity Act framework can ensure that defense measures keep pace. The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the SEC possess the authority to enforce this, and they should take action to drive the coordination that the industry has postponed for years.
Note: The views expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of CoinDesk, Inc. or its owners and affiliates.