A recent report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlights significant shortcomings among the 24 largest federal agencies in effectively preparing for the transition to post-quantum cryptography.
The first critical step in this transition was to identify systems vulnerable to future quantum computing threats. Only one agency compiled a complete list, while another did not create one at all, and the remaining 22 provided only partial assessments.
The report indicates that a lack of qualified personnel is a major factor behind these deficiencies, with 18 agencies reporting a shortage of cryptographers but no plans to address the issue. Only six organizations have begun training their staff.
Secondly, agencies were required to assess the costs associated with this transition. While 21 agencies prepared estimates, they all acknowledged that these were incomplete.
Based on these findings, the Office of Management and Budget informed Congress in 2024 that the transition of key systems between 2025 and 2035 could cost approximately $7.1 billion, primarily for replacing outdated hardware that cannot be upgraded.
The third requirement was to test new algorithms in their own environments. None of the agencies succeeded in this task; only one agency explored available market solutions, while 16 deemed testing premature, citing that vendors are still implementing new standards.
The GAO urged agencies not to delay preparations due to the "harvest now, decrypt later" scenario, where malicious actors gather encrypted data today in anticipation of future quantum machines capable of decryption.
Currently, quantum computers lack the capability to break existing algorithms, but the GAO suggests that this may change in the 2030s. A survey referenced in the report found that 21 out of 32 experts rated the likelihood of such machines emerging by 2040 at 50% or higher.
The initial version of the GAO report was released in September 2025 with limited access, providing 89 recommendations to 23 agencies regarding cryptography accounting, migration funding, and testing. The public version does not include new recommendations.
The audit period covered from February 2024 to September 2025, during which some agencies began addressing these shortcomings. For instance, the Social Security Administration revised its process for collecting cryptographic data, and the Department of Homeland Security reported ongoing preparations for quantum threats.
In June 2026, President Donald Trump mandated federal agencies to expedite the transition to the approved NIST post-quantum cryptography. The most critical systems are expected to adopt new key establishment mechanisms by the end of 2030.
The directive also requires each agency to appoint a migration officer.
Additionally, in September, QuSecure reported testing post-quantum protection measures on the U.S. Army's tactical systems.