Europol warns the cryptocurrency sector about potential vulnerabilities from quantum computing, emphasizing the need for proactive security measures.
Summary
- Europol has issued two reports highlighting the urgent need for the cryptocurrency sector to address potential threats from quantum computing.
- The agency points to wallet keys as a primary vulnerability, while blockchain hash functions are largely resistant to quantum attacks.
- Transitioning Bitcoin to quantum-safe standards could require extensive network downtime, estimated at a minimum of 76 days.
Europol has alerted the cryptocurrency industry and lawmakers to the significant risks posed by quantum computing in two reports released on Wednesday. The agency's European Cybercrime Centre identified cryptocurrency wallets as the main vulnerability, with their security relying on a pair of keys: a private key for transaction authorization and a public key for verification.
The report warns that an advanced quantum computer could potentially derive a private key from an exposed public key, allowing unauthorized access to funds, a scenario referred to as Q-Day.
Fortunately, the report indicates that the hash functions securing blockchain technology are generally resistant to quantum threats, as breaking a 256-bit hash is deemed extraordinarily difficult with current technology.
Despite the risks, the report reassures that cryptocurrencies are not on the brink of collapse due to quantum computing but emphasizes the need for proactive strategies to enhance security. It recommends a gradual transition to quantum-resistant cryptography and improved wallet security practices.
Wallets that already display public keys on-chain cannot be retroactively secured. The report advises users to migrate their funds to new wallets preemptively. According to blockchain analytics firm Glassnode, approximately 30.2% of Bitcoin has its public key compromised.
Transitioning Bitcoin to quantum-safe protocols involves substantial costs. The new NIST-standardized post-quantum signatures range from 10 to 120 times larger than the current signatures used, potentially burdening block space, raising fees, and causing delays in confirmations. A study estimates that migrating all unspent transaction outputs could require at least 76 days of cumulative downtime.
Europol's report also references projections from IBM and Microsoft, which anticipate significant advancements in quantum computing by 2029. In response to these threats, Coinbase's quantum advisory council has urged immediate post-quantum migration efforts, with Ripple and Stellar already developing strategies. Additionally, several firms, including BlackRock and Coinbase, have pledged $15 million over three years for research on Bitcoin security against quantum threats.
“Harvest now, decrypt later”
Europol's second report, produced with the University Carlos III of Madrid, explores the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” tactics, where attackers collect encrypted data now for potential future decryption. The report identifies common protocols like TLS, SSH, and OpenPGP as vulnerable, although no widespread exploitation has been observed yet.
The European Union's financial regulators have also raised concerns about the potential for quantum computers to break encryption before the technology becomes commercially available, advising member states to develop post-quantum migration strategies by the end of 2026.
In terms of payment systems, the report highlights that real-time interception poses a more immediate risk than retrospective decryption. It notes the possibility of a "just-in-time" attack, where a quantum computer could derive a private key in the short window between a transaction revealing its public key and the confirmation of that transaction.
To address these challenges, Europol recommends forming a working group led by the European Commission, involving Europol, the EU cybersecurity agency ENISA, and the EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority, to keep policymakers informed. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology has proposed phasing out widely used public-key configurations by 2030 and completely eliminating classical public-key cryptography by 2035.